Prenosimo iz Wall Street Journal Europe
14. ožujka 2003.
(hrvatski prijevod cemo uskoro objaviti)

FRIDAY/SATURDAY/SUNDAY, MARCH 14 - 16, 2003

East of the Oder/ By lvo Sanader
The Europeans Who Recognize Evil in Iraq

The question of whether to use force against Saddam Hussein has divided Europe like no other issue in recent history. Tensions are running so high between the United States and some of its closest European allies that the trans-Atlantic partnership itself may be jeopardized.

The European publics, elites and media are following Iraq-related news with a level of intensity bordering on obsession. Not surprisingly, there are extensive public discussions under way in Croatia regarding this issue. Indeed, countries like Croatia that aspire to the EU and NATO membership, and yet vividly recall the unique historic American contribution to the cause of European freedom, debate Iraq-related issues with particular vigor.

Given its own experience, Croatia also appreciates, better than most European countries, that evil is not a metaphysical abstraction but that its writ runs through the affairs of men—and that use of force, while invariably a horrible enterprise, is sometimes the only answer to the challenge posed by evil regimes.

Ironically, while not all European countries appear to appreciate equally the gravity of the threat posed by the Saddam Hussein's regime, it is also the case that the differences-both intra-European and trans-Atlantic-are less about ends than means. Everyone wants Iraq to comply with the United Nation Security Council resolutions requiring its disarmament. American, British and European leaders who support the U.S. position argue that immediate action must be taken against Iraq if it fails to comply. Some European governments, as well as much of European public opinion, believe that more time should be allowed for the U.N. inspections to work. The divisions are about strategy rather than values-but they are real nonetheless.

In public discourse, the policy favored by the opponents of immediate military action is often called "appeasement." Strictly speaking, this is incorrect. This concept of appeasement refers to the approach for dealing with Hitler that was prevalent in Europe during the 1930s. At the time, appeasement was driven by a desperate fear of a second world war (by men who had lived through the first). These sentiments prompted many European leaders to adopt an accommodating stance toward Hitler. Of course, the appeasers misjudged the circumstances, the moral imperatives and Hitler. The result was a disaster for everyone.

Today, however, no responsible European leader believes that the disarmament obligations imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War were unjust, or that the Iraqi dictator can be satiated by territorial (or other) concessions. The policy promoted by those who oppose the use of force against Iraq—either now or in the foreseeable future—is not one of appeasement but of procrastination.

Despite Saddam Hussein's 12-year record of violating 17 Security Council resolutions, including the most recent Resolution 1441, some Europeans still espouse the view that Saddam can be contained through a strong U.N. inspection program. Then, the reasoning goes, military action would be postponed and perhaps avoided all together.

On paper it all seems entirely reasonable. But is it realistic? And wouldn't the final consequence of such a policy be disastrous?

The answers to these questions do not have to be guessed, but can be established definitively by looking at the historical record. This record provides compelling evidence that the policy of procrastination is no more effective than that of appeasement.

In the 1990's, my own country, Croatia, had ample and tragic experience with the policy of procrastination. Croatia, together with Slovenia, was one of the Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic's early victims, and the ensuing war claimed thousands of lives and caused tens of billions of euros in material damages. Still, many prominent leaders argued that military intervention against Milosevic was a last resort and that we should go the extra mile for peace.

Yet Milosevic learned, very early on, that talk is cheap and can be easily manipulated, and that a determined dictator can pretty much achieve most of his goals during the period when democracies consider use of force to be the last resort. His ambitions were checked only after Croatia used force to liberate its occupied territory in 1995, and NATO followed with air strikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It still was not enough, since after a short break Milosevic started a new war in Kosovo. He was finally checkmated after a determined NATO action.

Had force been used against Milosevic early enough in 1991, four wars (against Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) could have been avoided, hundreds of thousands of lives could have been saved, "ethnic cleansing" would not have entered the European lexicon, the South-Central European region would not have been destabilized.

We face a similar situation today with Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq. It is certain that if Saddam obtains nuclear capability, it will be impossible to "contain" him, and far more costly to overthrow him. Even short of that, Hussein's possession of chemical and biological weapons, coupled with a nuclear bomb underway, creates a significant level of risk. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, waiting for the ruthless and evil enemy to deliver the first blow is risky policy.

These real political reasons aside, for countries like Croatia, that have spent decades under the ruthless yoke of communist dictatorship, the plight of the Iraqi people should not be ignored. It is for this reason that Croatia's voice and the opinions of the other Vilnius Ten (Slovenia, Slovakia, Macedonia, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria) bear a special weight and should be respected.

The Croatian people learned through history all the horrors and agonies of wars, and therefore our ultimate desire is for peace. However, history has also taught us that determined military action can sometimes prevent bigger tragedies. Because of that, together with Prime Ministers Aznar, Berlusconi, and Blair and numerous East and Central European leaders, I both understand and support America's determination to act. Those who continue to urge delay must now decide whether attachment to a policy of procrastination, which failed miserably in the 1990s, is worth a major break with the United States. I believe that such a policy does not deserve a second chance.

The policy merits of using force against Saddam Hussein aside, I also firmly believe that bonds between Europe and the U.S. should not be unnecessarily strained by any particular challenge or problem we face in today's world. Now, more than ever, vigorous trans-Atlantic cooperation is essential to world peace and stability. '

For my country and the party that I lead, definitive determination to be part of United Europe is inseparable from friendship and partnership with United States of America.

Dr. Sanader is president of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

Vrh